Mete Şeref Ahunbay

E-Mail mete.ahunbay@in.tum.de 
Phone +49 (0) 89 289 17502
Fax +49 (0) 89 289 17535
Office

Boltzmannstraße 3
Room 01.10.059
85748 Garching, Germany

Office Hours By prior arrangement only.

About

[This part is under construction.]

Publications

Conference Papers

  • Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding [arXiv] [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'20).
  • The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions [arXiv] [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE'20).
  • The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21).
  • Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming [MATLAB/Mathematica Code] [arXiv] [Springer]
    Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
    In Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT'21).

Teaching